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UNIVERSITY OF ARKANSAS AT LITTLE ROCK
LAW JOURNAL
VOLUME 10 1987-88 NUMBER 1
THE ARKANSAS LAW OF OIL AND GAS*
Susan Webber Wright**
Following is Chapter IV of a multichapter short treatise on the
Arkansas law of oil and gas. Other chapters appear in Volumes 9 and
10 of UALR Law Journal.*** This treatise is not intended as an in-
depth analysis, but rather as a description of the current state law
which, the author hopes, will be helpful to those not regularly en-
gaged in the oil and gas law practice.
CHAPTER IV
THE OIL AND GAS LEASE
An oil and gas lease in Arkansas conveys to the lessee the right of
exploration and development of these minerals.' The lessee's interest
is generally referred to as the "working interest." 2 The lessor receives
consideration in the form of bonus, delay rentals, and royalty, as pro-
vided in the lease. Many other provisions in the lease may determine
the rights and liabilities of the parties.
* All rights reserved by author. Material is subject to author's copyright.
** Professor of Law, University of Arkansas at Little Rock School of Law. The author
acknowledges and thanks Paula Williams, class of 1987, who helped in the research for this
project.
*** Chapters I and II concern the Nature of Oil and Gas Interests and Multiple Owner-
ship of Oil and Gas Interests and appear at 9 UALR L.J. 223 (1986-87). Chapter III is on
Conveyances of Oil and Gas Interests by Deed and appears at 9 UALR L.J. 467 (1986-87).
1. See the discussion in Wright, The Arkansas Law of Oil and Gas (Chapter I), 9 UALR
L.J. 223, 224-25 (1986-87), which notes that the Arkansas Supreme Court decision in Hillard
v. Stephens, 276 Ark. 545, 637 S.W.2d 581 (1982) characterized a lease of oil and gas as a sale.
2. See, e.g., Schnitt v. McKellar, 244 Ark. 377, 380, 427 S.W.2d 202, 207 (1968).
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The first topic of this chapter is the right of the lessee to the use
of the surface. The next section covers the lessor's proceeds from the
lease and the lease clauses governing these proceeds. Finally, this
chapter covers some Arkansas cases on specific lease clauses and sum-
marizes the various means by which a lease may terminate. Implied
lease covenants are the subject of the following chapter. This chapter
is not a description of the lease generally. For this, see one of several
good references.3
Lessee's Liability For Surface Damages
The owner of a mineral interest, or that owner's lessee, has an
easement of reasonable use of the surface for the purpose of develop-
ing the minerals.4 If the mineral owner or lessee has made an unrea-
sonable use of the surface, he is liable to the surface owner for
damages.
Arkansas has several cases involving surface damage by mineral
owners or their lessees.5 In Diamond Shamrock Corp. v. Phillips6 the
surface owner sued for damages because the defendant had located a
well on the owner's proposed homesite, even though one of the de-
fendant's employees had represented to the plaintiff that a well would
not be located there after the plaintiff protested that he did not want a
well on that site. Evidence showed that other locations would have
been suitable and that the well was located 160 feet south of the loca-
tion selected by the defendant and certified to the Oil and Gas Com-
mission. The defendant offered no explanation of why the well was in
fact drilled on the plaintiff's proposed homesite. A jury awarded ac-
tual damages based upon the difference in value of the property before
and after the well was drilled. Because the plaintiff failed to prove
wanton or willful misconduct on the part of the defendant, the jury
award of punitive damages was reversed. This decision indicates that
the standard of reasonableness requires that the right of surface use be
3. E.g., R. HEMINGWAY, THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS ch. 6 (2nd ed. 1983); 3 H. WIL-
LIAMS, OIL AND GAS LAW §§ 601-02 (1986).
4. E.g., Reimer v. Gulf Oil Corp., 281 Ark. 377, 664 S.W.2d 456 (1984); Diamond
Shamrock Corp. v. Phillips, 256 Ark. 886, 511 S.W.2d 160 (1974); Arkansas Louisiana Gas
Co. v. Wood, 240 Ark. 948, 403 S.W.2d 54 (1966); Wood v. Haye, 206 Ark. 892, 895, 175
S.W.2d 189, 190 (1943).
5. The Arkansas cases discussed in this treatise involve operations for development of oil
and gas. However, Arkansas has a number of decisions involving surface damages resulting
from the mining of hard minerals. See, e.g., Benton v. U.S. Manganese Corp., 229 Ark. 181,
313 S.W.2d 839 (1958); Paris Purity Coal Co. v. Pendergrass, 193 Ark. 1031, 104 S.W.2d 455
(1937).
6. 256 Ark. 886, 511 S.W.2d 160 (1974).
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exercised in a manner "least injurious" to the surface owner.7
The "before and after" measure is not always the appropriate
formula for determining surface damages. In Arkansas Western Gas
Co. v. Foster,' the jury was instructed, without objection, to measure
damages by ascertaining the rental value of improved pasture land
upon which the defendant had drilled and plugged a well, left a slush
pit, and built a road. The rental period was from the time of the
damage to the time the land was restored to the same condition prior
to the damage. In addition, the jury was told to award the surface
owner the costs of reseeding and otherwise restoring the pasture to its
prior condition. The Arkansas Supreme Court reversed and re-
manded a verdict for the plaintiff on grounds that there was no evi-
dence in the record on rental value. One disturbing aspect of this case
is that the jury instructions, which were not the issue on appeal, did
not acknowledge that at least some damage should result from the
reasonable use of the surface by a mineral owner or lessee, and there
should be liability only for damages resulting from unreasonable use.
The 1984 decision in Reimer v. Gulf Oil Corp.9 held that the
lessee's use of the surface was not unreasonable when the lessee built a
road across the plaintiff's tract to transfer a drilling rig to adjacent
land which was in the same drilling unit as the tract in question. The
lease expressly gave the lessee this right, so the court did not find it
necessary to rely upon any implied easement of reasonable use. This
decision, whether or not it is based upon an express lease clause, cer-
tainly reaches the result necessary for efficient production from drill-
ing units. If the surface owner in Reimer had also been a royalty
owner of the tract, he probably would not have objected to the road
across his land.
Water is part of the surface estate, and some Arkansas decisions
concern a lessee's damage to the surface owner's water. A 1966 deci-
sion, Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v. Wood, I° held that the following
7. Id. at 891, 511 S.W.2d at 163 (quoting from Martin v. Dale, 180 Ark. 321, 21 S.W.2d
428 (1929)). Martin involved use of the lessor's private road by the lessee, who was drilling for
oil on the lessor's property. The court approved the lessee's use of the private road on grounds
that use of this road was necessary, as it provided the lessee's only access. The Phillips decision
perhaps represents an adoption of the "accommodation" doctrine enunciated by the Supreme
Court of Texas in Getty Oil Co. v. Jones, 470 S.W.2d 618, 623 (Tex. 1971), without the re-
quirement that the lessor's use of the surface be an existing use. See E. KUNTZ, J. LOWE, 0.
ANDERSON, & E. SMITH, CASES AND MATERIALS ON OIL AND GAS LAW 119-20 (1986)
[hereinafter KUNTZ CASES AND MATERIALS].
8. 254 Ark. 14, 491 S.W.2d 380 (1973).
9. 281 Ark. 377, 664 S.W.2d 456 (1984).
10. 240 Ark. 948, 403 S.W.2d 54 (1966).
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lease clause did not give the lessee the right to use water from the
lessor's artificial stock pond: "Lessee shall have free use of oil, gas
and water from said land, except water from Lessor's wells, for all
operations hereunder." 1 The court affirmed a judgment for the lessor
for damages to his land and for use of water from the stock pond.
In 1967 the supreme court decided O'Brien v. Primm,'2 uphold-
ing a verdict for damage to well water resulting from a sandfracting
operation at the defendant's oil well. The majority of the court was
satisfied that there was sufficient evidence of the defendant's negli-
gence, but a strong dissent by Justice Fogleman, in which Justice
Brown joined, took the position that the plaintiffs did not prove negli-
gence or causation. This case did not concern the right of reasonable
use of the surface, for the plaintiff and defendant were not surface
owner and mineral owner in the same tract. However, this decision
might set a precedent for finding a mineral owner negligent in a sand-
fracting operation which results in damage to the surface owner's
water well.
There are two Arkansas decisions involving liability for damage
to water wells resulting from the use of seismographic tests in the
exploration for oil and gas. These tests employ explosives under-
ground. In Western Geophysical Co. v. Mason 13 the plaintiffs alleged
that the tests caused their well water to be muddy and unfit. The
Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed a jury verdict based upon the dif-
ference in the before and after values of the plaintiff's property. The
court noted that there was substantial evidence to justify the jury's
finding of negligence, but that a finding of negligence was not neces-
sary because explosives were used.14 This decision shows that the
court is willing to apply strict liability in tort for damages resulting
from the use of explosives in geophysical exploration."
In the 1967 case of Continental Geophysical Co. v. Adair,1 6 the
plaintiffs claimed that the defendant's seismograph operations caused
their wells to run dry. The court reversed and remanded on grounds
11. Id. at 949, 403 S.W.2d at 55.
12. 243 Ark. 186, 419 S.W.2d 323 (1967).
13. 240 Ark. 767, 402 S.W.2d 657 (1966).
14. Id. at 769, 402 S.W.2d at 658. The court quoted from 4 W. SUMMERS, OIL AND GAS
§ 661 (1962).
15. The opinion does not mention any Arkansas cases on liability for the use of explosives.
In an earlier case involving damage from explosives used to mine gravel, the Arkansas
Supreme Court recognized the rule that a finding of negligence is not essential to liability, but
did not adopt that rule because there was sufficient evidence of negligence to sustain the jury's
award. Benton Gravel Co. v. Wright, 206 Ark. 930, 175 S.W.2d 208 (1943).
16. 243 Ark. 589, 420 S.W.2d 836 (1967).
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that the plaintiffs failed to show causation. There had been a period
of drought preceding the failure of the plaintiff's wells. The court
distinguished the holding in Western Geophysical Co. v. Mason, in
which there was more evidence that the plaintiff's muddy well water
was caused by the defendant's operations. This holding and the dis-
senting opinion in O'Brien v. Primm illustrate that causation might be
a difficult element of proof for a plaintiff suing for damage to well
water.
The Arkansas legislature perceived the problem of surface dam-
ages as deserving of special treatment, and by Act 902 of 1983' 7 re-
quired an operator to give written notice of exploration or drilling to
the surface owner before entering upon the site and to file proof of
financial responsibility with the Oil and Gas Commission as a prereq-
uisite to the issuance of a drilling permit. The act further provides
that any surface owner "damaged or threatened with damage by the
neglect of the operator" has a lien on the operator's equipment and
fixtures. Depending upon interpretation of the awkward wording of
the Act, the lien might extend to production run to the credit of the
operator. 18
The provisions of Act 902 of 1983 were amended by Act 559 of
1985.' 9 The amendment requires a surface owner seeking damages
through the proof of financial responsibility to file a claim within one
year of the date of issuance of the drilling permit.
Act 44 of 1987 requires any operator who is to drive heavy oil
and gas equipment on county roads or municipal streets to file a bond
to cover anticipated damages to streets and roads. The amount of the
bond is determined by the county road foreman and supervisor or by
the municipal street department and must be "sufficient to repair
damage caused to the roads or streets by operating such equipment
17. This act is codified as ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 53-216 to -219 (Supp. 1985).
18. The Honorable Alex Sanderson has addressed problems with this act. Sanderson,
Recent Arkansas Legislation and Cases Affecting the Oil & Gas Industry, 23 ARK. NAT. RE-
SOURCES L. INST. (1984). ARK. STAT. ANN. § 53-219 (Supp. 1985) reads as follows:
Any surface owner that is damaged or threatened with damage by the neglect of the
operator, will have a lien upon the fixtures or equipment owned by the operator, with
all oil, gas and other hydrocarbons produced therefrom which may be run to the
credit of the operator to secure payment for all damages that can be lawfully recov-
ered under the terms of the oil and gas lease or leases covering the particular prop-
erty and under which drilling operations are being undertaken by [the] operator; and
further, the lien to secure payment for any other damages that the surface owner
would be entitled to recover from the operator under the laws of the State of
Arkansas.




In 1986 a majority of the Arkansas Supreme Court, in Bonds v.
Sanchez-O'Brien Oil & Gas Co.2' held that "the duty to restore the
surface, as nearly as practicable, to the same condition as it was before
drilling is implied in the lease agreement. ' 22 The defendant lessee,
after the lease had terminated, left "water pits, concrete slabs, dams,
and winrock stone on the surface."23 Recognizing that commentators
are divided on this issue,24 the majority reasoned that to hold other-
wise would allow the lessee, after termination of the lease, to continue
to occupy the premises and that such would be unreasonable surface
use. The dissent, written by Justice Newbern in which Justices
Smith and Purtle joined, pointed out that no other jurisdiction has
found an implied duty on the part of the lessee to restore the surface
in absence of legislation.26
Lease Proceeds
The lessor's consideration for the lease generally includes a bo-
nus, delay rentals, and royalty. The bonus is paid upon execution of
the lease. Delay rentals are generally payable during the primary
term of the lease to permit the lessee to postpone development yet
keep the lease in effect during the primary term.27 However, in a
"paid up" lease, delay rentals are paid with the bonus payment upon
execution of the lease. Royalty is reserved by the lessor and is payable
out of production. Although the traditional lessor's royalty in Arkan-
sas was an eighth of production free of expenses,2 8 greater fractions
20. Act 44 of 1987 is not codified at this writing.
21. 289 Ark. 582, 715 S.W.2d 444 (1986).
22. Id. at 585, 715 S.W.2d at 446.
23. Id. at 583, 715 S.W.2d at 445.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 585, 715 S.W.2d at 446.
26. Id. at 586, 715 S.W.2d at 446 (Newbern, J., dissenting). Justice Purtle wrote a sepa-
rate dissent and would have found for the lessee on grounds that the plaintiff, who was not the
original lessor, purchased the property in question with knowledge of the structures left by the
defendant. Id. at 585, 715 S.W.2d at 447 (Purtle, J., dissenting).
27. For example, a lease might provide that it is to last for "three years and as long
thereafter as oil and/or gas are produced." The primary term is for three years. Yet the delay
rental clause may provide as follows: "This lease shall terminate one year from this date unless
operations are commenced or unless lessee pays or tenders to lessor, or to lessor's credit at the
- Bank, the sum of - dollars." Thus, payment of delay rentals may keep the lease alive
during the primary term.
28. For example, this is the fraction deemed royalty for purposes of integrating unleased
mineral interests. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 53-115A-2 (Supp. 1985) (amended by Act 94 of 1987,
but not as to this royalty provision).
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have been reserved in recent years at times when the price of oil was
high.
Arkansas decisions concerning division of bonus, delay rentals,
and royalties among concurrent or successive owners are discussed in
Chapter 11.29
a. Improper Payment of Delay Rentals
Commentators divide delay rental clauses into two categories:
the "unless" clause and the "or" clause.30 Generally leases in Arkan-
sas are of the "unless" variety, as they provide that the lease will ter-
minate before expiration of the primary term unless the lessee
commences a well or pays delay rentals periodically.31 If a lessee has
not commenced a well, failure to pay delay rentals on or before the
due date in the specified manner to the proper party results in termi-
nation of the lease. According to the rule adopted by most jurisdic-
tions, the "unless" type of delay rental clause creates a limitation to
the lease and thus failure to pay the rental properly results in auto-
matic termination of the lease under its own terms.32 Logically this
would require a court to eliminate consideration of the equities in
favor of the lessee, for the court is not declaring a forfeiture, but is
instead recognizing that the lease has terminated under its own terms.
However, from time to time courts have considered equitable princi-
ples, such as estoppel and waiver, to bar a lessor's suit to terminate a
lease. 33 More commonly, courts excuse improper delay rental pay-
ments when the lessee has not been at fault, when the improper pay-
ment has been accepted by the payee, or where the transfer of the
ownership by the lessor has caused uncertainty concerning the iden-
tity of parties entitled to receive rental payments.34
The Arkansas Supreme Court has generally recognized the ma-
29. Wright, The Arkansas Law of Oil and Gas (Chapter II), 9 UALR L.J. 241, 245 (1986-
87).
30. For a discussion of authority on the "or" as opposed to the "unless" clause, see 3 E.
KUNTZ, OIL AND GAS ch. 29 (1967).
31. The "unless" lease is contrasted with the "or" variety of lease, in which the lessee
promises to drill or to pay rentals or to surrender the lease during the primary term. In the
event that the lessee of an "or" lease does not pay delay rentals, the lessor might sue for
payment (if there has been no surrender), while the "unless" lease terminates under its own
terms if the lessee fails to pay rentals or commence a well. See, e.g., Girolami v. Peoples
Natural Gas Co., 365 Pa. 455, 76 A.2d 375 (1950) ("or" lease).
32. For citations to authority on the "unless" lease, see 3 E. KUNTZ, supra note 30, at
§ 29.2.
33. E.g., Ledford v. Atkins, 413 S.W.2d 68 (Ky. 1967).
34. E.g., Armstrong v. McGough, 157 Ark. 173, 247 S.W.2d 790 (1923) (Lease preserved
by rental payment received by bank on due date but credited to lessor after due date when
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jority rule in cases concerning improper delay rental payments.35
However, in two cases involving late payment of rentals, the court
characterized the lease contract, with the delay rental clause, as an
agreement in which time is of the essence.36 The court could have
reached the same result by characterizing the delay rental clause as a
special limitation to the lease. In one of these cases, Harrell v. Saline
Oil & Gas Co. ,3 the court held that notice of the intent of the lessor to
declare a forfeiture is unnecessary for termination of the lease. In this
respect the court seemed to recognize that the lease had terminated on
its own terms, as a property interest subject to a special limitation can
terminate.
Arkansas has recognized that the lessee must tender the delay
rental payment to the proper party. In Vaughan v. Doss38 the lease
required that rentals be paid to the First National Bank of Magnolia
and deposited to the lessor's credit. By mistake the lessee paid the
rentals to the First National Bank of El Dorado, which did not notice
the error and which negotiated the check and deposited it to the les-
sor's credit. The mistake was not discovered until after the rental
payment date specified in the lease had passed. The lessor demanded
that the lessee cancel the lease and filed suit when it refused to do so.
The chancellor found for the lessor and the supreme court affirmed,
pointing out that lessees must strictly comply with lease provisions
and citing the Arkansas decisions holding that time is of the essence
in this kind of contract. The court pointed out that the Arkansas
legislature had recognized this rule in enacting Act 170 of 1923.39
b. Computation of Royalty
Royalty is defined as: "(1) The landowner's share of production,
free of expenses of production. (2) A share of production, free of ex-
lease provided that bank was lessor's agent). See also KUNTZ CASES AND MATERIALS, supra
note 7, at 139-40.
35. E.g., Harrell v. Saline Oil & Gas Co., 153 Ark. 104, 239 S.W. 731 (1922); Epperson v.
Helbron, 145 Ark. 566, 225 S.W. 345 (1920).
36. Harrell v. Saline Oil & Gas Co., 153 Ark. 104, 108, 239 S.W. 731, 732 (1922); Epper-
son v. Helbron, 145 Ark. 566, 225 S.W. 345 (1920).
37. 153 Ark. 104, 239 S.W. 731 (1922).
38. 219 Ark. 963, 245 S.W.2d 826 (1952).
39. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 53-314 (1971). In the event a lease terminates as a result of
rentals not being paid in accordance with the terms of the lease, the act allows the owner of the
fee to indorse on the margin of the record of the original lease a statement to the effect that
rental has not been paid and that the lease is forfeited. The owner must sign the statement,
which must be attested by the recorder. The statement is notice to subsequent purchasers of
the lease and is prima facie evidence of the termination of the lease.
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penses of production .... " 40 Although the expenses of production are
not deductible, other expenses, such as transportation and treatment
expenses, generally may be deducted from the royalty owner's share.41
Sometimes questions arise whether certain expenditures are non-de-
ductible production expenses or are deductible expenses not attributa-
ble to production.42
Arkansas has had occasion to determine the issue of the deduct-
ibility of transportation costs in computing royalty. In Clear Creek
Oil & Gas Co. v. Bushmaier4 3 the lease provided for royalty based
upon "market price of royalty gas at the well." There was no market
for the gas at the well, but the lessee transported the gas to Fort Smith
and Van Buren, where it was sold for 10 cents per thousand cubic
feet. The court found that the lessee's transportation and distribution
costs were 3 1/2 cents per thousand cubic feet, resulting in a market
price at the well of 6 1/2 cents per thousand cubic feet."
In Parnell, Inc. v. Giller45 the leases provided for royalty to be
based upon the "market value at the well" for brine sold or used off
the premises but upon the "amount realized" for brine sold at the
wells.46 The brine was not sold at the well but was piped to a chemical
company. The contract beween the lessee, Parnell, and the chemical
company required the lessee to deliver the raw brine to the chemical
company, where bromine was extracted, and to dispose of the spent
brine. Following Bushmaier, the court held that the transportation
costs were deductible in calculating the market value of the brine.47 A
majority of the court held that the expenses of disposal of spent brine
were also deductible on grounds that, like the transportation ex-
penses, disposal costs "are services that are essential to and peculiar to
the marketing of the product itself" which might well have been as-
sumed by the purchaser and which the purchaser takes into account
40. H. WILLIAMS & C. MYERS, MANUAL OF OIL AND GAS TERMS 770 (6th ed. 1984).
41. Id.
42. Eugene Kuntz takes the position that the lessee should bear any costs prior to ob-
taining a marketable product. But if the product is of a marketable quality, he would require
the lessor to share in the transportation expenses if the product is "unmarketable" merely
because there is no pipeline. 3 E. KUNTZ, supra note 30, § 40.5, at 322-33. On the other hand,
Howard Williams has taken the position in his treatise that the "[e]xpenses of treatment re-
quired to make the mineral product salable, e.g., expenses of dehydration," should be shared
by the lessor. 3 H. WILLIAMS, supra note 3, § 645.2, at 602.
43. 165 Ark. 303, 264 S.W. 830 (1924).
44. Id. at 307, 264 S.W. at 832.
45. 237 Ark. 267, 372 S.W.2d 627 (1963).
46. Id. at 268, 372 S.W.2d at 628.
47. Id. at 269, 372 S.W.2d at 628.
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in determining the purchase price.48 Justice McFaddin dissented on
allowing the deduction of disposal expenses, contending that such ex-
penses are business expenses to be borne by the lessee, "just like ad-
vertising, salaries, telephone, and such other items are business
expenses and not to be charged against the royalty interest.
49
Perhaps the expense of disposing of spent brine could be charac-
terized as a marketing expense on grounds that the lessee would not
have been able to sell the brine without agreeing to dispose of it after
the extraction of bromides. If this is the case, one could argue that
the lessee alone should bear the expense because it is part of the im-
plied duty to market the product.5" On the other hand, one might
argue that the expense should be shared by both the lessee and the
lessor because the brine is of unmarketable quality at the well and to
require the lessee to absorb all the expenses of making the product
marketable would bestow a windfall upon the lessor.5" Of course, the
preferred solution to this problem is for the lease to provide explicitly
for the calculation of the royalty.
c. Computation of Royalty-Statutory Provisions
The Arkansas legislature sought to protect the royalty owner
from unfairness and collusion of producers and purchasers when it
passed Act 222 of 1929.52 The Act prevents the producer and the
purchaser from contracting in such a manner as to deprive the royalty
owner of the benefits enjoyed by the producer under the contract.
The penalty for a lessee's or operator's (producer's) violation of these
provisions is forfeiture of the lease; the penalty for violation by a pipe-
line company or other purchaser is treble value of the amount of oil or
gas wrongfully taken from the royalty interest.5 3
Only two Arkansas Supreme Court cases have interpreted these
provisions. The first, Dobson v. Arkansas Oil & Gas Comm'n,5 4 held
that the penalty provision (section 6 of the Act) would not apply to a
purchaser which had taken the plaintiffs' minerals under the mistaken
assumption that the plaintiffs' interests were validly unitized. The
court pointed out that there was no indication of a conspiracy be-
48. Id.
49. Id. at 270, 372 S.W.2d at 629 (McFaddin, J., dissenting).
50. See supra note 42.
51. Id.
52. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 53-509 to -514 (1971).
53. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 53-514 (1971).
54. 218 Ark. 160, 235 S.W.2d 33 (1950).
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tween the producer and the purchaser."
The second Arkansas Supreme Court decision concerning this
act is Hillard v. Stephens,5 6 in which the court interpreted § 3, which
reads as follows:
It shall be the duty of both the lessee, or his assignee, and any pipe
line company, corporation or individual contracting for the
purchase of oil or gas under any oil, gas or mineral lease to protect
the royalty or lessors [sic] interest by paying to such lessor or his
assignees the same price including such premiums, steaming
charges, and bonuses of whatsoever name, for royalty oil or gas
that is paid such operator or lessee under such lease for the work-
ing interest thereunder."
Hillard had executed several leases to Stephens, some of which
contained a clause fixing royalty as follows:
The Lessee shall pay Lessor as royalty for gas the equal one-
eighth (1/8) of the value of such gas calculated at the rate of five
seven (7) cents per thousand cubic feet while the same is being sold
or used off the premises, measured according to the Standard Mea-
surement Law of the State in which the above described land lays
[sic]. 58
Hillard contended that the statute converted the fixed royalty
clause into a "proceeds" lease provision, requiring Arkla pay as roy-
alty one-eighth of the amount it received from the sale of the gas,
which would be in excess of 7 cents per thousand cubic feet.5 9 Alter-
natively, Hillard contended that under the penalty section of the Act
Stephens had forfeited the lease.' The court found for Stephens, rea-
soning that the legislature did not intend for the statute to convert all
fixed price leases into proceeds leases, pointing out that such would
not be favorable to lessors with high fixed price leases.6" In a later
federal diversity case, both the federal district court and the Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit followed the Hillard decision on this
point.62
55. Id. at 168, 235 S.W.2d at 37.
56. 276 Ark. 545, 637 S.W.2d 581 (1982).
57. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 53-511 (1971).
58. 276 Ark. at 547, 637 S.W.2d at 582.
59. On December 1, 1981, Stephens was receiving $0.3390 per thousand cubic feet for the
gas. Id. at 550, 637 S.W.2d at 585.
60. Id. at 549, 637 S.W.2d at 583.
61. Id. at 554, 637 S.W.2d at 585-86.
62. Taylor v. Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co., 604 F. Supp. 779, 785 (W.D. Ark. 1985),
aff'd, 793 F.2d 189, 193 (8th Cir. 1986).
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From the decisions in Hillard and Dobson one can conclude that
the Arkansas Supreme Court will apply Act 222 of 1929 only in cases
of conspiracy or fraud on the part of the purchaser and producer
against the royalty owner. This is the only possible conclusion, for a
literal interpretation of the statute would require a judgment for
Hillard.
d. Market Value Royalty
The nature of the natural gas market is such that gas contracts
are long term. In the 1970's the price of gas rose dramatically, and in
some instances the market price of gas far exceeded the price which
purchasers were paying under long-term contracts.63 This led to the
"market value royalty" issue, wherein lessors claimed a right to roy-
alty based upon the market value of the gas instead of the proceeds
received from the sale.' These lessors based their claims on leases
reserving royalty based upon "market value" or "market price." The
following royalty clause is typical:
Lessee shall monthly pay lessor as royalty owned gas, including
casing head gas, and other gaseous substance produced from said
land and sold or used off the premises, or for the extraction of
gasoline or other products therefrom, the market value at the well
of one-eighth of the gas so sold or used, provided that on gas sold
at the wells, the royalty shall be one-eighth of the amount realized
from such sale.65
The origins of this type of clause are unclear, but probably it
developed from the lessee's (or producer's) desire to recoup transpor-
tation and treatment charges the lessee had to bear when the gas was
delivered to the purchaser at some distance from the well.66 Thus,
when the lessee was required to build pipelines to connect to the pur-
chaser's pipelines, the sale is "off the premises" and the lessee could
recoup the pipeline costs prior to computation of the lessor's royalty,
63. See Wright, Market Value Royalty: Hillard and Beyond, 24 ARK. NAT. RESOURCES
L. INST. (1985).
64. An additional reason for the "market value" problem stems from the discrepancy
between the prices of gas sold in interstate commece, which was regulated, and the unregulated
price of intrastate gas. Id.
65. Diamond Shamrock Corp. v. Harris, 284 Ark. 270, 272, 681 S.W.2d 317, 319 (1985).
66. Wiese, Valuation of Gas for Royalty Purposes, 45 TEX. B.J. 1033, 1034 (Sept. 1982),
quoted in Wright, surpa note 63. In two cases which pre-date the market value royalty prob-
lem, the Arkansas Supreme Court recognized that the parties to the lease intended for some
costs to be deducted before calculating royalty based upon market value. Parnell, Inc. v. Gil-
ler, 237 Ark. 267, 372 S.W.2d 627 (1963); Clear Creek Oil & Gas Co. v. Bushmaier, 165 Ark.
303, 264 S.W. 830 (1924). Both cases are discussed above.
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which is based on "market value."67 On the other hand, if the pur-
chaser's pipeline connects to the wellhead, the lessee has no costs to
recoup and the lessor's royalty is based upon "the amount realized
from such sale," or the proceeds.6
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals offered a similar explanation
of this type of royalty clause in the 1984 case of Piney Woods Country
Life School v. Shell Oil Co. :69
The royalty compensates the lessor for the value of the gas at the
well: that is, the value of the gas after the lessee fulfills its obliga-
tion under the lease to produce gas at the surface, but before the
lessee adds to the value of this gas by processing or transporting it.
When the gas is sold at the well, the parties to the lease accept a
good-faith sale price as the measure of value at the well. But when
the gas is sold for a price that reflects value added to the gas after
production, the sale price will not necessarily reflect the market
value of the gas at the well. Accordingly, the lease bases royalty
for this gas not on actual proceeds but on market value.7"
At the heart of the "market value" litigation is the method of
determining market value. One method is to determine the value in
the unregulated free market at the time of production and delivery.7'
As a rule this value is much greater than the contract price under
long-term gas sale contracts and is therefore the measure sought by
the lessor. This approach has been adopted by courts in Texas,72
Kansas,7 3 Montana, 74 and Mississippi. 75  Another method of deter-
67. Wiese, supra note 66, at 1034.
68. Id.
69. 726 F.2d 225 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1005 (1985).
70. Id. at 231.
71. If this is to be the measure of "market value," the factors to be considered can include
comparable sales. Piney Woods Country Life School v. Shell Oil Co., 726 F.2d 225, 238-39
(1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1005 (1985). Comparable sales have included sales from the well
in question, Diamond Shamrock Corp. v. Harris, 284 Ark. 270, 273, 681 S.W.2d 317, 319
(1984), and sales from a large geographic area of many square miles, Exxon Corp. v. Middle-
ton, 613 S.W.2d 240 (Tex. 1981). The Texas Supreme Court would not permit consideration
of unregulated intrastate sales in First Nat'l Bank in Weatherford v. Exxon Corp., 622 S.W.2d
80 (Tex. 1981), but the Kansas Supreme Court held otherwise in Lightcap v. Mobil Oil Corp.,
221 Kan. 449, 562 P.2d 1, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 876 (1977).
72. E.g., Foster v. Atlantic Refining Co., 329 F.2d 485 (5th Cir. 1964); Texas Oil & Gas
Corp. v. Vela, 429 S.W.2d 866 (Tex. 1968).
73. Matzen v. Cities Service Oil Co., 233 Kan. 846, 667 P.2d 337 (1983), cert. dismissed,
472 U.S. 1023 (1985); Lightcap v. Mobil Oil Co., 221 Kan. 448, 562 P.2d 1, cert. denied, 434
U.S. 876 (1977).
74. Montana Power Co. v. Kravik, 179 Mont. 87, 586 P.2d 298 (1978).
75. Piney Woods Country Life School v. Shell Oil Co., 726 F.2d 225 (5th Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 471 U.S. 1005 (1985).
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mining "market value" is the price or proceeds received from the sale
of the gas in question. Oklahoma 76 and Louisiana 77 adopted this ap-
proach, as did Arkansas in the 1982 decision in Hillard v. Stephens.
78
However, Arkansas did not follow Hillard in the 1984 decision in Di-
amond Shamrock Corp. v. Harris.79 A discussion of these decisions
follows.
e. Arkansas Decisions on "Market Value" Royalty
The first decision in Arkansas on the "market value" royalty is-
sue was the 1982 case of Hillard v. Stephens.8 0  Beginning in 1957,
Hillard executed seven leases to Stephens, the lessee. Five 8 of the
leases provided for royalty at the "Prevailing Market Price at Well...
for gas" being sold or used off the premises." 2 There was gas produc-
tion from the wells, and Stephens sold the gas to Arkla under long-
term purchase contracts. Stephens paid the plaintiffs 3 royalty based
on the proceeds of the sale, and the plaintiffs accepted this royalty
until they filed this suit in June, 1979, alleging that the royalties were
underpaid, as the royalty clause provided for royalty based on "pre-
vailing market price at the well." The trial court held that the royalty
clause required payment on the basis of" 'current sales' of the gas on
a daily basis through November 8, 1978, and thereafter by reference
to section 105 of the Natural Gas Policy Act . . . which fixes the
maximum price for such gas at the price specified in the existing con-
tracts under which Ark-La purchased the gas from Stephens."
'8 4
The Arkansas Supreme Court held for Stephens: the plaintiffs
were entitled to receive royalty based upon proceeds of the sales under
the long-term contracts. The court reasoned that the "prevailing
market price at well" was the price received under the contracts be-
cause "a lease constitutes a present sale of all of the gas in place at the
time such lease is executed; and as the gas leaves the well head, the
76. Tara Petroleum Corp. v. Hughey, 630 P.2d 1269 (Okla. 1981).
77. Henry v. Ballard & Cordell Corp., 418 So. 2d 1334 (La. 1982).
78. 276 Ark. 545, 637 S.W.2d 581 (1982), discussed in Note, Hillard v. Stephens: Inter-
pretation of Market Price Royalty Provisions in Natural Gas Leases, 36 ARK. L. REv. 312
(1982).
79. 284 Ark. 270, 681 S.W.2d 317 (1984).
80. 276 Ark. 545, 637 S.W.2d 581 (1982).
81. The other two leases provided for a fixed royalty of 7 cents per MCF. The court's
decision upholding this clause is discussed in the section on Computation of Royalty Statutory
Provisions, supra notes 52-62 and accompanying text.
82. 276 Ark. at 547, 637 S.W.2d at 582.
83. The plaintiffs were the heirs of Hillard.
84. Id. at 548, 637 S.W.2d at 583.
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entire ownership thereof is in the lessee, none being reserved in the
lessor.""5 Quoting the decision of the Oklahoma Supreme Court in
Tara Petroleum Corp. v. Hughey,16 the court held that to calculate
royalties on the basis of current market value would be unfair to Ste-
phens and would be contrary to the expectations of the lessors.8 7 The
contract price of $0.339 per MCF (thousand cubic feet) was much
lower than the current market price of $2.40 per MCF. To base roy-
alty on the latter price would award the plaintiffs a royalty of $0.30,
leaving Stephens only $0.039 per MCF. 8 The court noted that the
long-term contract of sale was executed in good faith and the contract
price was fair and reasonable at the time.89 If such were not the case,
the court would hold otherwise on grounds that the lessee had not
fulfilled its duty to protect the interests of the lessors by marketing
"the gas efficiently and effectively." 90
Justice Darrell Hickman dissented to this holding, quoting the
trial court which decided that the words "market price" have a "com-
mon and ordinary meaning" and "refer to what the commodity will
bring when placed on the market. And .... the word 'prevailing'
refers to the conditions in existence at any given time and are change-
able from day-to-day or at other given periods."91 Justice Hickman
reasoned that Stephens knew the difference between a proceeds lease
and a market value lease and that there was evidence that Hillard
would have refused to lease to Stephens and would have leased to a
competitor had the lease not contained the "market value" clause
favorable to the lessor. However, Justice Hickman stated that the
trial court was correct in looking to the plain meaning of the lease
instead of to other evidence of the parties' intent.
The majority of the Hillard court could have reached the same
result without stating the questionable conclusion that an Arkansas
mineral lease constitutes a sale of the minerals in place. For example,
it could have reasoned that the royalty clause providing for market
price or market value for gas sold or used off the premises is to insure
85. Id. at 550, 637 S.W.2d at 583. The holding that a lease constitutes a present sale of
the minerals in place is contrary to previous Arkansas law. See Wright, supra note 1, at 224-
25.
86. 630 P.2d 1269 (Okla. 1981).
87. Hillard v. Stephens, 276 Ark. at 551, 637 S.w.2d at 584.
88. Id. at 550-51, 637 S.W.2d at 584.
89. Id. at 552-53, 637 S.W.2d at 585.
90. Id. at 552, 637 S.W.2d at 585. The requirement of a good faith, arms-length bargain
was required by the Tara decision in Oklahoma, as noted by the court. Id. at 551, 637 S.W.2d
at 584.
91. 276 Ark. at 556, 637 S.W.2d at 586-87 (Hickman, J., dissenting).
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that the lessor receive no more than one-eighth of the proceeds which
would have been realized by a sale at the well.92 This reasoning
would have permitted a royalty based upon net proceeds when the
"sale" takes place upon delivery of the gas to the purchaser. The
court might also have found for the lessee on grounds that the public
interest requires royalty based upon proceeds, as royalties are costs
included in the rate base of public utilities and are paid in part by the
consumer of natural gas. However, this reasoning would have no di-
rect application to the facts in Hillard because the purchaser, Arkla,
was not subject to the "market value" royalty provision and was pay-
ing a contract price unaffected by the royalty Stephens was paying its
lessors.93
The next decision on the market value royalty problem was Dia-
mond Shamrock Corp. v. Harris.94 In this 1984 decision the Arkansas
Supreme Court was faced with a lease clause providing for royalty
based upon "the market value at the well of one-eighth of the gas so
sold or used, provided that on gas sold at the wells, the royalty shall
be one-eighth of the amount realized from such sale." 95 Harris, the
lessor, executed the lease to Diamond Shamrock in 1977. At that
time Diamond Shamrock had executed a long-term gas sale contract
with Arkansas Louisiana Gas Corporation (Arkla) which included
land in the county in which the Harris property was located. The
contract had been filed with the county but did not appear in Harris'
chain of title. Harris contended that he was entitled to royalty based
on market value, not upon the proceeds from the gas purchase con-
tract, or alternatively, to cancellation of the lease for failure of Dia-
mond Shamrock to give him notice of the contract at the time he
executed the lease. The trial court refused to cancel the lease but
awarded Harris royalty based upon market value as determined by
the amount other participants in the same well were paid.
96
The Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed, without mentioning the
decision in Hillard that royalty should be based upon proceeds. The
Harris court reasoned that Harris had no knowledge of the purchase
contract with Arkla even though he had specifically asked the lessee's
92. See J. LOWE, OIL AND GAS LAW IN A NUTSHELL 254-65 (1983).
93. This public policy argument would not persuade the Supreme Court of Kansas. Not-
ing that the Federal Power Commission (FPC) had no jurisdiction to regulate the payment of
royalties, the court held that royalty payments would be determined by the contract provisions
and would be considered by the FPC in setting rates. Lightcap v. Mobil Oil Corp., 221 Kan.
448, 562 P.2d 1, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 876 (1977).
94. 284 Ark. 270, 681 S.W.2d 317 (1984).
95. Id. at 272, 681 S.W.2d at 319.
96. Id. at 273, 681 S.W.2d at 319.
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representative about the terms of the lease before he executed it, that
the filing of the contract was not notice to Harris because it was
outside his chain of title, and that Diamond Shamrock should have
informed Harris if it was relying on the contract with Arkla to set the
basis for royalty.97 The court said that "[tjo hold otherwise would
place Harris in the unfair position of being compensated for the gas
produced from his property by a contract to which he was not a party
nor had any notice of when negotiating his lease with Diamond
Shamrock."98 The court concluded that any uncertainty as to the
meaning of market value should be resolved in favor of the lessor and
against the lessee, the drafter of the instrument. 99
Chief Justice Webb Hubbell dissented on grounds that Harris
had constructive knowledge of the contract filed of record with the
county. The dissenting opinion points out a more persuasive reason
for reversing the lower court: the lease provided for royalty based on
proceeds for gas sold at the well, and this gas was sold at the well."°
The value of the Harris decision as precedent is questionable, as
the court's holding for the lessor was apparently based upon the fact
that Harris had no notice or knowledge of the existing long-term
purchase contract through which his gas was to be sold. Therefore,
one might conclude that Harris sets a narrow precedent. This was the
conclusion of the federal courts in Taylor v. Arkansas Louisiana Gas
Co. 101 However, Harris is difficult to reconcile with Hillard in one
significant respect. The Harris court indicated that the meaning of
"market value" is uncertain and thus interpreted that term in favor of
the lessor, while the Hillard decision held that "market price at well"
means proceeds received from the sale under the terms of a long-term
purchase contract executed in good faith for a price reasonable at the
time of execution. Perhaps a later decision will help resolve the ques-
tion whether "market value" and "market price" are ambiguous
terms in a lease royalty clause.'
0 2
97. Id. at 275-76, 681 S.W.2d at 320-21.
98. Id. at 276, 681 S.W.2d at 321.
99. Id. For the rule that the instrument should be construed against the drafter, the court
cited Bradley v. Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co., 280 Ark. 492, 659 S.W.2d 180 (1983); Schulte v.
Benton Say. & Loan Ass'n, 279 Ark. 275, 651 S.W.2d 71 (1983); Gibson v. Pickett, 256 Ark.
1035, 512 S.W.2d 532 (1974).
100. 284 Ark. at 270, 681 S.W.2d at 321 (Hubbell, C.J., dissenting).
101. 604 F. Supp. 779 (W.D. Ark. 1985), aff'd, 793 F.2d 189 (8th Cir. 1986).
102. Neither Hillard nor Harris, in either the majority or dissenting opinions, distinguishes
between market price and market value. Perhaps the two should be distinguished. See Light-
cap v. Mobil Oil Corp., 221 Kan. 448, 562 P.2d 1 (Fromme, J., concurring and dissenting),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 876 (1977).
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The United States District Court for the Western District of Ar-
kansas and the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit followed Hil-
lard in Taylor v. Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. 103 The facts in Taylor
differed from those in Hillard in one significant respect: the lessee's
interest was jointly owned by Stephens (the lessee in Hillard) and by
Arkla (the purchaser in Hillard), which means that Arkla, as lessee,
was not bound as a seller to a long-term purchase contract as was
Stephens in the Hillard case. Arkla did have, however, a long-term
contract to purchase the gas owned by Stephens. The Eighth Circuit
reasoned that the Hillard rule on market value royalty should still
apply, for there was nothing in the lease to indicate that a different
royalty should be paid "on the same production under the same terms
set out in the same leases."' "°
f. Payment of Royalty
In Schaffer v. Tenneco Oil Co. 105 the Arkansas Supreme Court
followed the general rule that nonpayment of royalties is not grounds
for forfeiture of the lease unless the lease provides otherwise. The
reason for this rule is that the lessor has an adequate remedy at law
for damages. 1
0 6
The Arkansas legislature has responded to the problem of non-
payment or delayed payment of royalties and other lease proceeds
payable from the sale of production 07  By Act 269 of 1981,108 the
legislature required proceeds from the sale of oil or gas to be paid "no
later than six (6) months after the date of first sale, and thereafter no
103. 793 F.2d 189 (8th Cir. 1986), aff'g Taylor v. Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co., 604 F.
Supp. 779 (W.D. Ark. 1985).
104. 793 F.2d at 192. The court listed other reasons for affirmance of the district court's
summary judgment for the lessees, including the Hillard decision's reasoning that a lease con-
stitutes a present sale of the gas in place. Hillard v. Stephens, 276 Ark. 545, 550, 637 S.W.2d
581, 583 (1982). As pointed out in an earlier chapter, Arkansas had never before recognized
the lease as a sale of the minerals in place but had instead consistently held that the lease
constitutes a conveyance of an easement in the land. Wright, supra note 1, at 224.
105. 278 Ark. 511, 647 S.W.2d 446 (1983).
106. Id. at 513, 647 S.W.2d at 447.
107. Proceeds other than royalty derived from the sale of production would include oil
payments or production payments and overriding royalties. Generally these are payable not to
the landowner or lessor, who receives royalty, but to others with an interest in the well.
108. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 53-525 (Supp. 1985), amended by Act 94 of 1987. The 1987
amendment apparently does not apply to the oil production in south Arkansas, as Act 94
provides:
Section 4. Limitations. The terms of this Act shall not be applicable to any produc-
ing unit or well that produces liquid hydrocarbons only, or liquid hydrocarbons asso-
ciated with the production of gas or gas produced associated with the production of
liquid hydrocarbons.
[Vol. 10:5
ARKANSAS LAW OF OIL AND GAS
later than sixty (60) days after the end of the calendar month within
which subsequent production is sold."'0 9 "First purchaser" means
"the first commercial purchaser after completion of the well and shall
not include purchasers of oil or gas during initial testing prior to com-
pletion." ' °" If payment is withheld because of title problems, pay-
ment must still be made to those whose title is marketable."'
Penalties for failure to pay include payment of 12% interest,1 2 and, if
payments are withheld willfully, 14% interest." 3 The prevailing
party in a suit brought under this statute is entitled to costs and to
prescribed attorneys' fees.' If the owner of the right to drill willfully
breaches the obligation to pay royalties, a court may decree cancella-
tion of the lease."' If he fails to pay royalties to the mineral owner
within 180 days of the marketing of production, the mineral owner is
entitled to 12% interest on unpaid royalties. 116
Two Arkansas Supreme Court decisions have interpreted this
Act. The first, TXO Production Corp. v. Page Farms, Inc.,I 17 was an
action brought by Page Farms to recover unpaid royalties and inter-
est. Mr. and Mrs. Page executed a lease and later conveyed the leased
property to their corporation, Page Farms, Inc. The corporation con-
veyed the property to a limited partnership, Page Farms, for tax pur-
poses, but the deed, recorded a few weeks before trial, contained a
property description which was void on its face. TXO acquired the
lease and completed a producing gas well in February, 1982. In Sep-
tember, 1982, TXO received a title opinion that the record owner was
the corporation, and in March, 1983, TXO sent a division order to the
Page Farms, Inc., which was not signed or returned. TXO did not
pay royalties and contended that it was excused because title was un-
marketable, the division order was not signed and returned, and the
Pages had not notified TXO of the conveyance to the corporation, as
required by the lease. The court held that title was marketable and
was in the corporation, as found by TXO's counsel in the title opin-
109. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 53-525(A) (Supp. 1985). There is a proviso that proceeds may be




113. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 53-525(B) (Supp. 1985) amended by Act 94 of 1987.
114. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 53-525(C) (Supp. 1985) amended by Act 94 of 1987.
115. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 53-525(D) (Supp. 1985).
116. Id. There is a proviso that royalties may be remitted annually when the aggregate of
twelve months' royalty is $25 or less. Id.
117. 287 Ark. 304, 698 S.W.2d 791 (1985).
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ion. 118 Failure of Page Farms to sign a division order did not excuse
payment of royalties, according to the court, when the division order
contained provisions unauthorized by the lease and when there was
no proof that the Pages knew that the custom in the industry is to
require execution of division orders as a condition to payment of roy-
alties." 9 The court found that failure of the lessors to notify the lessee
of the transfer of ownership was not a material breach of the lease, for
TXO had notice by its title examination of the transfer. 20 The lower
court's award of unpaid royalties, plus statutory interest and attor-
ney's fees, was affirmed.
Justice Newbern, in a dissenting opinion in which Chief Justice
Holt joined, 2 ' would excuse delayed payment (but not payment it-
self) because of the lessors' failure to notify TXO of the change in
ownership. The dissent notes that this failure, coupled with the fail-
ure to sign the division order, resulted in confusion as to the identity
of the lessor. The dissent also points out that TXO had no duty to
examine title, although it had done so.' 2 2
The second case interpreting section 53-525 was TXO Production
Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank of Russellville, 123 an action to recover penal-
ties and attorney's fees for late payment of royalties. TXO started
producing gas from the well in question in 1982. Some of the gas was
sold to Arkla and some to Columbia Gas Transmission Service.
Although Arkla started taking the gas in May, 1982, TXO and Arkla
did not enter into a purchase agreement until August, 1983. TXO
began to receive payment from Arkla in October, 1983, and paid roy-
alties to the bank in November, 1983. TXO contended that it paid
royalties within six months of the "date of first sale," as required by
the statute. But the bank contended that the date of first sale should
be measured from the time Arkla first took the gas from the well.'
24
The court held for the bank:
118. Id. at 306, 698 S.W.2d at 792.
119. Id. at 306, 698 S.W.2d at 792.
120. Id. at 307, 698 S.W.2d at 793. The court cited the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CON-
TRACTS § 241 (1981) to the effect that materiality of a breach is determined in part by the
injured party's loss of a substantial benefit. The court reasoned that TXO gained its expected
benefits under the lease. The court pointed out that this defense was apparently an after-
thought. 287 Ark. at 308, 698 S.W.2d at 793.
121. 287 Ark. at 309, 698 S.W.2d at 794 (Newbern, J., dissenting).
122. Id.
123. 288 Ark. 338, 705 S.W.2d 423 (1986).
124. Id. at 340, 705 S.W.2d at 424. The trial court found that the first sale occurred in
February, 1982, when Columbia first took gas under its contract with TXO. Id. at 341, 705
S.W.2d at 425. The opinion does not state when TXO paid royalties due under this contract.
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We don't think the General Assembly intended, in passing this
clearly remedial legislation, to put it in the power of a gas producer
to circumvent the statute's impact by the form and timing of his
sales agreements with third parties. 25
The court also held that the bank had no duty to notify TXO
that it intended to file suit, pointing out that such notice was not re-
quired by the statute, although the parties could agree otherwise by
contract.1 26 This decision and the holding in Page Farms indicate
that the Arkansas Supreme Court is likely to interpret section 53-525
in favor of the lessor or other party entitled to receive lease proceeds
from a purchaser or producer.
g. Apportionment of Royalties
When a landowner who has leased his oil and gas subsequently
conveys part of his leased land, or when the land is otherwise divided
into separately owned tracts, a question arises concerning entitlement
to royalties when production is from fewer than all of the individually
owned tracts. One view is to apportion royalties among the owners of
the several tracts in proportion to their ownership of the minerals in
the entire leasehold.I27 This approach is called the "apportionment
theory" and is followed by a minority of jurisdictions which have de-
cided the question. 28 A majority of jurisdictions follow the "nonap-
portionment theory," under which the royalty is paid only to the
owners of the tract or tracts where producing wells are located.
129
Arkansas followed this rule in the 1912 decision in Osborn v. Arkansas
Territorial Oil & Gas Co. 130
Despite the "nonapportionment" rule, royalties are apportioned
in a great majority of Arkansas leases. Apportionment can result
from agreement of the parties through an "entireties" clause in the
lease. A typical entireties clause reads as follows:
If the leased premises are now or hereafter owned in severalty or in
separate tracts, the premises, nevertheless, shall be developed and
operated as an entirety, and royalties shall be paid to each separate
owner in the proportion that the acreage owned by him bears to
the entire leased acreage.
125. Id. at 340-41, 705 S.W.2d at 424.
126. Id. at 341, 705 S.W.2d at 425. Notice is now required. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 53-525(c)
(Supp. 1985) amended by Act 94 of 1987.
127. See 2 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 520 (1986).
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. 103 Ark. 175, 146 S.W. 122 (1912).
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Compulsory or voluntary pooling 3 may also defeat the nonap-
portionment rule. Compulsory pooling, or integration, is effected
through the Oil and Gas Commission upon petition of an owner in an
established drilling unit. 3 2 Voluntary pooling results from agreement
of the parties, most commonly effected through a pooling clause in the
lease. The effect of pooling is that the individual royalty or mineral
interests are included with other acreage for purposes of drilling a
well, and royalties are paid according to each owner's proportionate
interest in the pooled acreage, without respect to ownership of the
well site.
Specific Lease Clauses
In addition to the clauses on bonus, royalty, and delay rentals,
the oil and gas lease might contain numerous other types of standard
clauses, some of which have been the focus of litigation in Arkansas.
a. Habendum Clause
The habendum clause of an oil and gas lease ordinarily provides
that the lease will remain in effect for a certain period (the primary
term) "and as long thereafter as oil or gas is produced." Several is-
sues have arisen with respect to this clause.
1. "Paying quantities"
In order to keep the lease alive pursuant to the habendum clause,
"production" means "production in paying quantities," the meaning
of which has been litigated numerous times in other jurisdictions.' 133
In the 1986 decision in Turner v. Reynolds Metal Co. 131 the Arkansas
Supreme Court interpreted "paying quantities" as meaning produc-
tion profitable to the lessee. ' 3 The lease in question had one gas well,
which was one of ten wells operated by the lessee in the field. In
131. Pooling is the subject of a subsequent chapter.
132. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 53-115A-l(b) (1971). However, exploratory units are now per-
mitted by Act 881 of 1985, codified in ARK. STAT. ANN. § 53-114 (Supp. 1985). This section
permits establishment of exploratory drilling units when owners of at least a 50% undivided
interest "in the right to drill and produce" agree. Whether the owner of a non-operating
interest may petition for integration has not been specifically addressed by the Arkansas
Supreme Court.
133. E.g., Clifton v. Koontz, 160 Tex. 82, 325 S.W.2d 684 (1959). One Arkansas case has
held that paying quantities means "commercial quantities, and not merely a sufficient quantity
for domestic use of the lessor." McLeon v. Wells, 207 Ark. 303, 305, 180 S.W.2d 325, 326
(1944).
134. 290 Ark. 481, 721 S.W.2d 626 (1986).
135. Id. at 483, 721 S.W.2d at 627.
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determining whether a well was profitable to the lessee, the court as-
certained the expenses of the well in question by prorating what the
lessee paid to a contract pumper to service all ten wells.136 The court
determined that the lessee, Reynolds, had lost money on the well
every year of the secondary term of the lease. Thus, the lease termi-
nated for failure of production in paying quantities and the termina-
tion dated from the end of the primary term.'37
In Turner the court left unanswered numerous questions con-
cerning determination of "paying quantities" for purposes of sus-
taining the lease under the habendum clause. Among these questions
are whether drilling and depreciation expenses, as opposed to mainte-
nance and lifting expenses, must be included in determining a well's
profitability. 
38
2. Cessation of production
Because the habendum clause requires that the lease continue "as
long thereafter as there is production," it follows that a cessation of
production would cause the lease to terminate under its own terms.
However, the courts have not been so harsh, as a cessafion of produc-
tion might be temporary and can result from forces outside the con-
trol of the lessee or operator, such as equipment failure, act of God, or
some other circumstance. In Reynolds v. McNeill"' the Arkansas
Supreme Court, noting the lessee's large expenditure of funds in ob-
taining production, held that "[i]t would be harsh and inequitable to
say that upon a temporary stoppage of production the lessor can de-
clare a forfeiture and take over the property himself. Hence most au-
thorities allow the lessee a reasonable time within which to reinstate
paying production."'" In Reynolds the lease was for a primary term
of six months and there was production within the primary term. But
pumping was discontinued near the end of the primary term because
of problems with salt water and, it was believed, sand in the casing.
The lessee continued with diligence to rework the well, and when the
lessor sought to have the court declare the lease forfeited, the chancel-
136. Id. at 484, 721 S.W.2d at 627.
137. Id. at 484, 721 S.W.2d at 628.
138. In Turner the court was able to determine that the well was unprofitable by consider-
ing only maintenance expenses. Arguably, drilling expenses should not be included as an ex-
pense in determining profitability for purposes of the habendum clause if the operator can
recoup some of his costs through production, even if he will never be able to make a profit on
the overall operation. See Garcia v. King, 139 Tex. 578, 164 S.W.2d 509 (1942).
139. 218 Ark. 453, 236 S.W.2d 723 (1951).
140. Id. at 456, 236 S.W.2d at 725.
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lor gave the lessee sixty days in which to rework the well. The Arkan-
sas Supreme Court affirmed.
In another decision, Saulsberry v. Siegel,' the Arkansas
Supreme Court held that the lease had not terminated when produc-
tion ceased in 1930 as a result of a derrick fire, even though produc-
tion was not resumed until 1934. However, weighing in favor of the
lessee was the fact that the lessors did not object to rebuilding the
derrick and resumption of production until 1951, when the lessors
sought to terminate part of the lease.
From the Reynolds and Saulsberry decisions one can conclude
that in Arkansas, once there is production and a cessation of produc-
tion in the secondary term, the lease is not forfeited automatically but
can continue for a reasonable time following cessation of production
in order to give the lessee an opportunity to restore paying produc-
tion. Furthermore, the Arkansas Supreme Court appears to have rec-
ognized estoppel in Saulsberry, as the holding seems to be based on
the lessor's permitting the lessee to restore production and his failure
to declare the lease forfeited after four years' cessation. 142
In Reynolds and Saulsberry the lease made no specific provision
for temporary cessation of production, and therefore the court was
free to allow the lessee a reasonable time to resume production. If a
lease provides that the lessee must resume production within a speci-
fied period of time, a court will enforce that provision.' 3
3. Modification of Habendum Clause by Continuous
Operations Clause
In the event the lessee has begun operations but has not obtained
production by the end of the primary term, the lease might terminate
on its own terms, as the typical habendum clause requires production
141. 221 Ark. 152, 252 S.W.2d 834 (1952).
142. The Supreme Court of Texas has held that cessation of production brings about an
automatic termination of the lease, and that therefore, the lessor cannot be estopped for his
actions after the automatic termination. Watson v. Rochmill, 137 Tex. 565, 155 S.W.2d 783
(1941).
143. For example, in Wilson v. Talbert, 259 Ark. 535, 535 S.W.2d 807 (1976), Haltom, a
lessor of an undivided interest, signed a lease which did not include any provision on tempo-
rary cessation of production. Talbert, the owner of another undivided interest in the same land
executed a lease which provided that the lessee had to commence operations within 60 days of
cessation of production. The lower court held that the lessee was bound by the lease provi-
sions as to Talbert's lease but had a reasonable time to commence operations under the Haltom
lease. There was no appeal as to the Haltom lease and the Supreme Court affirmed the chan-
cellor as to the Talbert lease but found the clause inapplicable. 259 Ark. at 539, 541, 535
S.W.2d at 809-10.
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in the primary term. However, many leases contain provisions which
propel the lease into the secondary term by commencement of opera-
tions only. Of course, there can be much debate about what consti-
tutes "operations" for this purpose. In one Arkansas case, Haddock
v. McClendon, " the lessors sought cancellation of the lease when the
lessee had built a road and had drilled to a depth of only thirty feet by
the end of the three year primary term. The lease contained the fol-
lowing clause:
Notwithstanding anything in this lease contained to the contrary,
it is expressly agreed and covenanted that if the lessee, his heirs,
successors or assigns, shall commence drilling operations at any
time while this lease is in force, this lease shall remain in force and
effect, and the term and life shall continue as to the entire acreage
described herein, so long as such operations are prosecuted, and if
production results from such operations, then as long thereafter as
such production continues.
1 45
The court noted that this was a "commencement" form lease as op-
posed to a "completion" one which would require production within
the primary term. 14 6 The court found that good faith and diligence
were required of the lessees, but held that the evidence did not indi-
cate a lack of good faith when the lease permitted the lessees to com-
mence operations near the end of the primary term. The court
pointed out that the lessees were bound to exercise diligence once they
had started operations, but that they were excused from continuing
their efforts after the lessor notified them that the lessor considered
the lease terminated. 147
Some clauses designed to keep the lease alive by commencement
of operations are narrowly construed to permit only completion of the
well or wells being worked at the end of the primary term. If that
well or those wells are productive, then the lease continues. 4 8 But if
they are dry or unproductive, the lease terminates and the lessee may
144. 223 Ark. 396, 266 S.W.2d 74 (1954).
145. Id. at 397, 266 S.W.2d at 75 (emphasis supplied by the court).
146. Id. at 401, 266 S.W.2d at 77.
147. Id. at 402-03, 266 S.W.2d at 78.
148. Eg., Tate v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 172 Kan. 351, 240 P.2d 465 (1952). The clause
in Tate read as follows:
If the lessee shall commence to drill a well within the term of this lease or any exten-
sion thereof, the lessee shall have the right to drill such well to completion with
reasonable diligence and dispatch, and if oil or gas, or either of them, be found in
paying quantities, this lease shall continue and be in force with the like effect as if
well had been completed within the term of years herein first mentioned.
Id. at 355, 240 P.2d at 467.
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not commence operations on a new well following the end of the pri-
mary term. 1
49
4. Modification of Habendum Clause by "Commencement"
Delay Rental Clause
As pointed out above, delay rentals are paid during the primary
term to keep the lease alive in absence of production. Frequently a
delay rental clause forgives payment of the rental if the lessee has
begun operations on the premises, even if there has been no produc-
tion. Typically such a clause reads in pertinent part as follows:
If operations for the drilling of a well for oil or gas are not com-
menced on said land on or before one year from the date hereof,
this Lease shall terminate as to both parties, unless the Lessee shall
on or before that date pay or tender to the Lessor [delay
rentals]....
Under this type of clause it is clear that the lessee need not pay or
tender the delay rentals if operations are begun by a rental due date.
However, the clause does not address the issue whether commence-
ment of operations alone, without production, is sufficient to keep the
lease alive beyond the primary term. As noted above, the habendum
clause permits the lease to continue into the secondary term for as
long as there is production. Yet some courts have interpreted this
type of delay rental clause to propel a lease into the secondary term by
commencement of operations. 1 10 Arkansas has no cases on this issue.
b. Force Majeure Clause
The wording of this type of clause takes many forms, but its pur-
pose is to keep the lease alive despite cessation of operations or pro-
duction and despite breach of the lease covenants as a result of factors
listed in the clause. Such factors may include acts of God and govern-
mental regulation.
In Wilson v. Talbert15' the Arkansas Supreme Court had before
it the interesting question of whether to apply a continuous operations
clause or a force majeure clause. The latter read as follows:
All express and implied covenants of this lease shall be subject to
all applicable laws, government orders, rules and regulations. This
lease shall not be terminated in whole or in part, nor lessee held
149. E.g., Skelly Oil Co. v. Wickham, 202 F.2d 442 (10th Cir. 1953).
150. See R. HEMINGWAY, supra note 3, § 6.6 for a discussion on the split of authority on
this point.
151. 259 Ark. 535, 535 S.W.2d 807 (1976).
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liable in damages because of a temporary cessation of production
or of drilling operations due to breakdown of equipment or due to
the repairing of a well or wells, or because of failure to comply
with any of the express or implied covenants of this lease if such
failure is the result of the exercise of governmental authority, war,
lack of market, act of God, strike, fire, explosion, flood or any
other cause reasonably beyond the control of lessee. 52
The continuous operations clause required the lessee to commence op-
erations within sixty days of cessation of production in the secondary
term. Production ceased in March, 1974 (after expiration of the pri-
mary term) because of a leak in an oil storage tank. The lessee at-
tempted to enter the premises to repair the tank in July, 1974 (outside
the time limit permitted by the "sixty day" clause) and was refused
entry by a lessor, Talbert. The court held that the force majeure
clause applied to the situation at hand, not the so-called "sixty day"
clause, as the latter applied to "cessation of production because of
depletion or threatened depletion of the well or wells rather than a
temporary cessation because of such things as temporary lack of stor-
age facilities."15 3 Because the force majeure clause did not have a time
limitation within which production had to be resumed, the lessee had
a reasonable time. However, the court held that the lessee had not
resumed production within a reasonable time because the lessee had
available another storage tank, adjacent to the leaky one, which could
have easily been used.' 54
c. Free Gas Clause
This clause is designed to permit the lessor to take gas for domes-
tic use from a well producing under the lease. As with other types of
clauses, there are many variants of this one. Two Arkansas decisions
exemplify the importance of careful drafting of this clause.
In Post v. Tenneco Oil Co. 155 the plaintiff, a lessor, contended that
the free gas clause permitted him to take gas from a well that was not
on his property but was in a unit which included his property. The
supreme court found for the lessor, reversing the lower court. The
free gas provisions were part of the royalty clause and read as follows:
To pay Lessor for gas from each well where gas only is found, the
equal one-eight [sic](1/8) of the gross proceeds at the prevailing
152. Id. at 537-38, 535 S.W.2d at 808.
153. Id. at 540, 535 S.W.2d at 809.
154. Id. at 540-41, 535 S.W.2d at 810.
155. 278 Ark. 527, 648 S.W.2d 42 (1983).
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market-rate, for all gas used off the premises, said payments to be
made monthly if $10.00 or more and Lessor to have gas free of cost
from any such well for all stoves and inside lights in the principal
dwelling house on said land during the same time by making his
own connections with the well at his own risk and expense.156
The court reasoned that any ambiguity in the lease should be con-
strued against the party preparing it, the lessee."5 7 Further, the opin-
ion says that the lessee's interpretation of the lease was "strained and
forced," and inconsistent with lessee's payment of royalties to the les-
sor because his land was in the producing unit.
158
An earlier Arkansas decision, Cranston v. Miller,59 denied the
lessor free gas from a well producing oil, but not gas, commercially.
The lease clause provided:
To pay lessor one-eighth part of the gas from each well where gas
only is found, while the same is being used off the premises, and
lessor to have gas free from any such well for all stove and inside
lights in the principal dwelling house on said land during the same
time by making his own connections with the wells at his own risk
and expense.16°
The court reasoned that two conditions attached to the lessor's right
to free gas, neither of which was met: "1st, it must come from a well
where gas only is found, and 2nd, the gas so found in a gas well only
must be used off the premises."
' 161
d. Express Drilling Covenants
Occasionally (but not usually) a lessee promises in a lease to drill
a well or wells. If this drilling covenant is breached, an interesting
question arises concerning the lessor's remedies.
At least two decisions from Arkansas have dealt with the prob-
lem. In Harvey v. Marr 162 a contract between Marr, the owner of an
undivided one-half mineral interest, and the operator required the op-
erator to drill a second well in the event that a first well produced in
excess of 100 barrels of oil per day. The first well met that require-
ment, but the operator, who also had purchased the other one-half
mineral interest, assigned its interest to the defendant, Harvey, who
156. Id. at 528, 648 S.W.2d at 43.
157. Id. at 529, 648 S.W.2d at 44.
158. Id. at 530, 648 S.W.2d at 44.
159. 208 Ark. 156, 185 S.W.2d 920 (1945).
160. Id. at 157-58, 185 S.W.2d at 920.
161. Id. at 159, 185 S.W.2d at 921.
162. 173 Ark. 880, 293 S.W. 1005 (1927).
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did not drill the second well. The plaintiff, Marr, obtained a court-
appointed receiver, who contracted with another party to drill a sec-
ond well. In a partition action between Marr and Harvey, Harvey
was charged the entire cost of drilling the second well.' 63 Because the
well in question was almost certain to be a producer and because the
plaintiff actually drilled the well which the defendant had covenanted
to drill, the cost of drilling the well was undoubtedly the appropriate
measure of damages. However, if the well had never been drilled, the
cost of drilling it might be an inappropriate measure of damages, par-
ticularly if events subsequent to the contract indicate that a well
would likely be unprofitable."64
A 1922 federal diversity case from Arkansas, Sanzenbacher v.
Howard-Clay Oil Co., 165 rejected the view that the proper measure of
damages is always the cost of drilling a well. An oil company agreed
that in exchange for a lease to plaintiffs' land, it would commence
drilling a well within sixty days. The company failed to drill, and the
plaintiffs sought recovery on the company's performance bond, con-
tending that the failure of the company to drill the well resulted in the
plaintiffs' losing the ability to sell land surrounding the well site to
speculators. The plaintiffs introduced evidence showing that the drill-
ing of a well would have enhanced the value of surrounding land.
The lower court granted nominal damages only on grounds that the
plaintiffs had introduced no evidence on the cost of drilling a well,
which the lower court held to be the proper measure of damages,
pointing out that the plaintiffs could have enhanced the value of sur-
rounding land by drilling a well themselves. But the Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit ruled that the plaintiffs had no such obligation
and had proven a "clear, clean-cut loss, caused by default on the con-
tract.' 66 The court enunciated, in somewhat awkward language,
what should be the rule in each case involving breach of an express
drilling covenant:
[T]he measure of damages is, in each separate case, such loss as
actually resulted from that character of losses which could have
163. Id. at 885, 293 S.W. at 1007.
164. For a discussion of the various measures that may be appropriate, see 5 H. WILLIAMS
& C. MEYERS, supra note 127, §§ 885.1-885.5. When the covenant to drill a well is not part of
a lease but instead is in a contract of assignment of the lessee's interest, the lessee frequently
reserves a production payment or overriding royalty. If the lease terminates from failure of the
assignee to drill, the assignor's loss might be measured by the value of the interest he lost as a
result of the assignee's failure to drill. See, e.g., Denman v. Aspen Drilling Co., 214 Kan. 402,
520 P.2d 1303 (1974).
165. 283 F. 13 (8th Cir. 1922).
166. Id. at 15.
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fairly been foreseen and therefore must be held to have been within
the contemplation of the parties at the time the contract was
made. 167
Termination of an Oil and Gas Lease
From the foregoing it is clear that an oil and gas lease may termi-
nate for failure of production or for failure to commence operations at
the end of the primary term. Similarly, the lease may terminate under
an "unless" type of delay rental clause for improper or untimely pay-
ment of rentals. Likewise, after there is production, a cessation of
production in the secondary term may result in termination of the
lease if production is not resumed within a reasonable time. The next
chapter, which concerns implied lease covenants, shows that a court
of equity may cancel a lease for breach of implied convenants.
a. Abandonment
But there is one other means a lease may terminate which de-
serves mention: by the lessee's abandonment. This is consistent with
the characterization of the lease as an easement. ' 68 Arkansas has rec-
ognized that a mineral lease may be terminated in this fashion. In
Zappia v. Garner, 169 the lessee had sunk a mining shaft in 1953 or
1954, had carried off a few carloads of iron at that time, and in 1956
or 1957 had taken some limestone samples from the land. This was
the extent of the lessee's activity, and the plaintiffs brought suit to
have the lease canceled for breach of an implied warranty to search
and develop. In holding for the plaintiff, the Arkansas Supreme
Court held that the lessee had breached his obligation " 'to proceed
with the search and also with the development of the land, with rea-
sonable diligence' . . . 'and may thereafter be treated as having aban-
doned his contract . .. " . 7 Similarly, other cases finding
abandonment of the lease have sounded in breach of the lessee's obli-
gation, which may be express or implied, to develop the lease. 71  The
Arkansas cases thus seem to be based upon breach of covenants in-
stead of abandonment. It would seem that breach of covenant is a
preferable basis for these decisions, as abandonment ordinarily re-
167. Id.
168. See Wright, supra note 1, at 224.
169. 259 Ark. 794, 536 S.W.2d 714 (1976).
170. Id. at 795-96, 536 S.W.2d at 715 (quoting Millar v. Mauney, 150 Ark. 161, 169, 234
S.W. 498, 501 (1921)).
171. E.g., Millar v. Mauney, 150 Ark. 161, 234 S.W. 498 (1921); Mansfield Gas Co. v.
Alexander, 97 Ark. 167, 133 S.W. 837 (1911).
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quires an intent to abandon, 172 an element that could be difficult to
prove with respect to mineral leases.
b. Statutory Provisions on Lease Termination
By Act 192 of 1921173 Arkansas requires that upon forfeiture of a
lease, a lessee must cancel or release the lease in the official record.'74
If a lessee fails to so release or cancel after thirty days' notice by the
owner of the land, the lessee can be liable for double damages plus
attorneys' fees and costs.
175
The Arkansas Supreme Court has held that the double damages
provision is penal and must be strictly construed.' 76  Thus, if the
lessee in good faith contends that the lease has not been forfeited and
has reasonable grounds to support that contention, the provision on
double damages will not be enforced.
77
172. See R. BROWN, THE LAW OF PERSONAL PROPERTY 8-9 (W. Raushenbush 3rd ed.
1975). In Millar v. Mauney, 150 Ark. 161, 175, 234 S.W. 498, 503 (1921), the court said that
abandonment is "a mixed question of law and fact."
173. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 53-312 to -313 (1971).
174. Id. § 53-312 (1971).
175. Id. § 53-313 (1971). This section provides that the damages are to be "not less than
two annual rentals as fixed by the original lease and all costs, including a reasonable attorney's
fee to be fixed by the court."
176. Prewitt v. Chambers, 209 Ark. 807, 194 S.W.2d 186 (1946).
177. Hill v. Larcon Co., 131 F. Supp. 469 (W.D. Ark. 1955); Prewitt v. Chambers, 209
Ark. 807, 194 S.W.2d 186 (1946).
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